Knowing When Not to Enter

Enter the category — or walk away?

As part of its Innovation & Renovation (I&R) initiative, a leading biscuit brand was evaluating entry into the Jams, Jellies & Marmalades (JJM) category.

Some professionals within the organization believed JJM was a dying category, particularly with the growing adoption of chocolate spreads and cream cheese in Pakistani breakfast routines.

Before committing significant investment in production machinery, CAPEX and marketing, the brand needed evidence. Not opinions. Evidence.

We didn't just ask consumers. We went into their homes.

Stage 3 designed a multi-layered research program to understand how JJM actually fitted into consumers' lives.

01 — Focus Group Discussions

We began with qualitative research through FGDs with homemakers and children to understand breakfast habits and routines, category usage, product and flavor preferences, switching behavior, perceptions of JJM and the role of chocolate and cheese spreads.

02 — In-Home Ethnography

We then went beyond what consumers said and observed what they actually did. Stage 3 conducted In-Home Visits (IHVs) during breakfast on both weekdays and weekends.

This allowed us to observe real-life breakfast behavior: what families actually ate, how breakfast choices changed across the week, which spreads were used, how children influenced breakfast choices and how different family members made food choices.

03 — Kitchen & Pantry Checks

We also conducted kitchen and pantry checks to understand what was actually present in consumers' homes — a real-world view of what consumers say they buy, what they actually buy and what they actually consume.

04 — Retail Measurement Validation

Consumer findings were subsequently mapped against Nielsen Retail Measurement Services, providing a broader market and retail perspective, and connecting consumer behavior with household reality and retail data.

JJM wasn't dead. It was simply not trending.

The research challenged the initial hypothesis. While JJM was not a particularly fashionable or rapidly trending category, chocolate spreads and cheese spreads were not replacing it completely.

Why? Because consumers had different breakfast needs and flavor occasions. Breakfast menus changed. Sometimes consumers wanted chocolate. Sometimes cheese. And sometimes they wanted something fruity and refreshing — a need that JJM continued to fulfill.

One particularly important finding: JJM was still part of the monthly grocery basket in households. The category had retained a place in consumers' routines even without being a major trend.

The research uncovered another opportunity. JJM had a visibility problem: the category was relatively weak in advertising, and no major brand was strongly owning the territory of JJM as a healthy or wholesome breakfast option.

But opportunity alone does not make a category attractive. The economics had to make sense.

Sometimes the smartest growth strategy is not to enter.

Stage 3 combined the consumer insights with Nielsen Retail Measurement data to assess the actual attractiveness of the category.

The retail data showed approximately 7% annual category growth. The category was not dying — but neither was it demonstrating the kind of explosive growth that would justify significant investment in a highly competitive market.

The brand also faced:

• Existing established players
• A relatively saturated market
• Limited consumer excitement around the category
• Significant production machinery requirements
• High CAPEX requirements
• The need for substantial investment to build a new category position

The numbers changed the decision.

A strategic decision — backed by evidence.

Stage 3 helped the brand establish three critical truths.

01 — The category was not dying

JJM continued to grow at approximately 7% annually.

02 — Consumer need still existed

Households continued to purchase JJM as part of their regular grocery basket.

03 — Entry was not sufficiently attractive

Given market saturation, existing competition, moderate growth and significant CAPEX requirements, entering the category did not present a compelling enough return opportunity.

The brand ultimately decided not to enter the JJM category. Rather than making a large capital investment based on assumptions about a supposedly "dying" category, the company made a data-backed decision to stay out.

That insight gave the client the confidence to walk away from a significant CAPEX commitment.

And sometimes, avoiding the wrong investment is as valuable as finding the right one.